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I am always eager to inspect new philosophical conceptions of the mathematical sciences to see 
whether they have given the mathematical component what I consider to be its rightful due. All too 
often philosophers of science implicitly buy the logical empiricist line that mathematics is a branch 
of logic, broadly speaking, and thus a transparent language whose involvement in scientific theories 
in no sense frames or mediates our understanding of the world. Even those more sophisticated 
philosophers who have left behind a naïve empiricism to examine the mediating effects of our 
instruments and models have little to say to us on the subject of mathematics.  On the other hand, 
when the logical empiricist attitude to mathematics is rejected and the use of mathematics is taken 
to involve something more than the use of a logical language, this largely amounts to a kind of 
literalism which worries about our being committed to the sorts of abstract entities physicalists take 
not to exist. Philosophies which find in the application of mathematics something of significance 
other than a troublesome problem are fairly rare, and experience shows that most of these owe 
considerable allegiance to Kantianism.  
In his recent Dynamics of Reason, the philosopher of science and Kant enthusiast Michael 
Friedman has provided us with a rich, synthetic vision of how science should proceed, which 
accordingly pays mathematics far more respect. To acquire a proper sense of this vision I can only 
recommend that you read his book. In the limited space I have here the quickest way to indicate 
what is involved is by sketching his account of the arrival and bedding down of Einstein's  General 
Theory of Relativity, the ‘exemplar',  we might say, of Friedman's  scheme. Starting out from 
Newtonian gravitation, written in the mathematical language of the calculus in a Euclidean setting, 
which had received its meta-scientific grounding in Kant's  philosophical system, through the 
nineteenth century mathematicians devised new forms of geometry and corresponding forms of 
calculus. With the resources of this language available Einstein could give new constitutive laws 
for the physics of the cosmos, in such a way that Newtonian cosmology could be reinterpreted 
approximately as one of a broader set of empirical possibilities. This work of reinterpreting the 
earlier theory is an essential part of scientific work, but, of course, presented in these new terms to a 
pre-revolutionary advocate of the old theory it would have seemed quite incomprehensible. 
What has been achieved by this re-interpretation, Friedman terms ‘retrospective 
communicative rationality'.  But this does not satisfy Friedman. What is especially novel in his 
account is his depiction of the means by which not just retrospective communicative rationality is 
achieved, but also a prospective version. In the case of general relativity, the associated meta-
scientific work was carried out by Helmholtz, Mach, and Poincaré, stretching the Kantian 
schematism in light of the transformations of geometry by Riemann, Lie and Klein, and in 
Helmholtz'  case his own psychophysical research. Poincaré's  meta-scientific work was conducted 
in the context of his conventionalist philosophy. After the Einsteinian revolution, further meta-
scientific work goes into bedding the theory down, thereby sparking off a novel philosophy. In this 
case the role was played by Schlick, Reichenbach and Carnap. 
For Friedman, when all of these component parts pull together, science is working at its 
best. It's  a truly optimistic picture which gives you a glow of pride for ploughing the noble furrow 
of philosophy, a discipline that could make a contribution to one of mankind's  greatest intellectual 
achievements. Before we get too carried away, however, a possible worry here is that there haven't  
been too many of these successes, especially in recent decades. How do other ‘revolutions'  fare? It 
is, we might say, a constitutive principle of Friedman's  scheme that only the mathematical sciences 
will feature, although he does find scope to bring Darwinian evolution into the story. In the case of 
the original Newtonian revolution, we have: the invention of the calculus and its later development 
by Euler et al.; the meta-scientific spadework being done by Galileo, Descartes, Leibniz and 
Newton himself. Then, there's  Kant, of course, at the other end of the revolution giving a 
philosophical shape to Newtonianism and separating philosophy from natural science in the 
process. 
What of quantum mechanics, surely by any account one of our most successful pieces of 
natural science? Most of us will have gained the sense that all is not well with the interpretation of 
this theory, but where does the fault for this lie? Well, the mathematics was certainly quickly in 
reasonable shape. Indeed, the speed with which Weyl and von Neumann intervened is staggering. 
And had this revolution been philosophically achieved, that is, had it been another exemplary case 
of Friedman's  scheme, we would have heard from him a rich tale of the development of 
mathematics, about how work on integral equations, spectral theory, group representation theory, 
Fourier analysis and its massive generalisation in the shape of harmonic analysis, Wedderburn 
structure theorems, von Neumann algebras, C*-algebras, and so on provided a constitutive 
language in which the physical laws of quantum mechanics could be expressed.
 Along with the new powerful mathematical framework came the ability to see how the 
earlier classical theories succeeded as well as they did in certain regimes. So, one cannot fault 
quantum mechanics for its retrospective communicative rationality. No, what seems to be missing 
in the quantum case relates to the forward movement, in other words, quantum mechanics has been 
let down by the lack of meta-scientific framework. For Friedman, while quantum mechanics has 
been empirically successful, philosophical contributions have not been ‘timely'  (pp. 120-121). 
There has to be something right about this. But I want to leave that to one side for the moment and 
now return to the mathematics used in quantum theory to wonder what Friedman is to make of it. 
The mathematical path he has outlined for us in most detail, the one relating to the Einsteinian 
revolution (Riemannian geometry, Klein's  Erlanger Programme, Hilbert's  foundations of 
geometry) seems to lead inexorably to the logical empiricist view of mathematics as a part of logic 
plus the odd principle. We can afford to be generous and take set theory of 1930. Does anything 
about the development of the mathematics used in quantum theory mentioned above challenge this 
notion? For instance, does the fact that von Neumann constructs a very different style of 
mathematical analysis, one which appeared so strange to G. H. Hardy in the mid-1930s that he 
could wonder aloud whether it was really mathematics, does this fact constitute an augmentation of 
the constitutive capacity of mathematics, even if in principle it can all be done in set theory? If not, 
I'm afraid there isn't a huge capacity for the kind of changes in mathematics that Friedman needs.
Let me try to apply more pressure on this point by carrying on the story of the quantum 
revolution to quantum field theory. Now, Dyson famously maintained that mathematics and physics 
divorced in the 1930s over the problems of dealing with the infinities that plague quantum field 
theory. Where mathematicians had previously had the resources in stock to deal with the problems 
posed them by physics, or at least they weren't  far from hand, quantum field theory had them 
stumped. Disliking the cavalier attitude of the physicists, they turned inwards, leaving the 
physicists to get on with things as best they could. Reconciliation came in the late 1970s with a 
realisation that both parties had interesting things to tell each other. We won't  subject this story to 
too much scrutiny here save to point out that Soviet mathematicians might be said to have kept 
communication alive, but instead pass on to see how the couple are faring today. Well, here things 
are looking quite encouraging. Regarding the mathematically suspect Feynman diagram 
calculations, we can see several proposals on the table as to how to bring them safely within the 
mathematical fold. Rather promising is Kreimer and Connes'  attack on the renormalisation group 
and the discovery of a Hopf algebra closely resembling one Connes had earlier found in his 
noncommutative geometry programme.
Perhaps, noncommutative geometry will be part of something larger, the Holy Grail of a 
quantum gravity. Certainly, connections have been made to string theory. String theorists avoid 
some of the notorious infinities by passing from the Y-shaped particle interactions of the Feynman 
diagram to the smoothness of an upside-down ‘pair of pants'  cobordism. Now, while string theory 
and more broadly conformal field theory are using plenty of category theory, this is also the case 
for the other leading contender in the race to a consistent quantum gravity, which uses, if anything, 
more of the stuff, and, partially inspired by Grothendieck, higher-dimensional versions at that. I'm  
referring to work in the loop quantum gravity paradigm. Here, Feynman diagrams are ‘categorified'  
into spin foams. Space-time emerges from a weave of representations (in the mathematical sense). 
Now string theorists are glancing over and taking note of 2-category theory in an attempt to get at a 
non-abelian string theory (note 1). It's all very heady stuff.
Let's  get to the crux of the matter. I have mentioned these developments to pose the 
following question of Friedman's scheme:
If things work out and we end up with as good a quantum field theory, or even quantum gravity, as 
we could hope for, should we be led to take it as a confirmation of his scheme by saying that it has 
been achieved by mathematics broadening its constitutive principles?
What Friedman says concerning mathematics inclines me to think that he might answer ‘No'  to this 
question. Rather than any of the glorious mathematics mentioned above, Friedman makes what he 
admits to be a speculative suggestion that the quantum logic of von Neumann and Birkhoff may 
prove to be the breakthrough. So in his book, the only pieces of mathematics we hear about are 
Euclidean geometry, the calculus, Riemannian geometry, Hilbert's  Foundations of Geometry, then 
the possibility of quantum logic. It seems as though for Friedman a change in our mathematical 
principles following the 'foundational' period must impact on either the set theoretic framework or 
the classical logic used with it. I think not. Even if quantum logic gets up and running, it's  just 
going to be seen as one way of viewing the structure of orthomodular lattices, a piece of 
mathematics perfectly capable of being formulated in terms of set theory and good old classical 
logic. Nobody's  going to start systematically ignoring the distributive law in the meta-language. 
Nobody will say "I have an orthomodular lattice which is boolean and I know that any 
orthomodular lattice is either finite or infinite, but I can't  say that my orthomodular lattice is either 
finite and boolean or infinite and boolean". No, if that line of von Neumann should prove to be a 
fruitful way to view quantum mechanics, it must be taken at an intra-mathematical conceptual level, 
for example, as being part of noncommutative geometry, or perhaps the category theorists will tell 
us it points to the right setting for quantum mechanics in some variety of monoidal category. (See 
Baez forthcoming about the possibility that "...quantum theory will make more sense when 
regarded as part of a theory of spacetime" and his claim that "...we can only see this from a 
category-theoretic perspective - in particular, one that de-emphasizes the primary role of the 
category of sets and functions."). It is already at this level that we shall have to be able to speak of 
radical overhaul, just as while the discovery that the internal logic of a topos is constructive does 
not mean than Bishop triumphed, one can claim with some justification that the very arrival of the 
topos notion marked such an overhaul. So, if Friedman cannot see this and other aspects of what 
has taken place in mathematics in the post-1930 era as already involving a radical overhaul, then I 
suspect his scheme is in trouble.
What this comes down to can be equated crudely with the question whether there are 
‘revolutions'  in mathematics in the post-1930 era (note 2). It's  perfectly convincing to talk of a 
century long revolution from 1800 onwards (see Gray 1992), but can we have revolutions post 
ZFC, even if we don't exceed its bounds? Yes, I would say. I'm  glad to see that van Fraassen thinks 
it possible too (2002: 239n8), although significantly here too he alludes to classical logic being at 
stake when he invokes an article where a supposed revolutionary new logic - intuitionistic this time 
- failed. But we don't  have to remain with the potential for revolutions, because we're  going 
through one right now. My revolution like Gray's  is a long drawn out and defuse affair. If after the 
revolutionary event the lines appear reasonably sharp, when you are in the thick of things it's  more 
like being in a cloud. 
Pierre Cartier, once a Bourbaki member, tells us:
When I began in mathematics the main task of a mathematician was to bring order and 
make a synthesis of existing material, to create what Thomas Kuhn called normal 
science. Mathematics, in the forties and fifties, was undergoing what Kuhn calls a 
solidification period. In a given science there are times when you have to take all the 
existing material and create a unified terminology, unified standards, and train people in 
a unified style. The purpose of mathematics, in the fifties and sixties, was that, to create 
a new era of normal science. Now we are again at the beginning of a new revolution. 
Mathematics is undergoing major changes. We don't know exactly where it will go. It is 
not yet time to make a synthesis of all these things - maybe in twenty or thirty years it 
will be time for a new Bourbaki. I consider myself very fortunate to have had two lives, 
a life of normal science and a life of scientific revolution. (Senechal 1998)
Perhaps the best article to consult concerning what he includes in this revolution is his 'Mad Day's 
Work' paper (Cartier 2001). See also Yuri Manin's (2002) very interesting 'George Cantor and his 
heritage', which points to higher categories as the new 'foundations', the term taken to mean "...the 
historically variable conglomerate of rules and principles used to organize the already existing and 
always being created anew body of mathematical knowledge of the relevant epoch." (p. 6).
One might have expected that philosophers would be crawling all over category theory. It's 
not everything, but...
A great deal of modern mathematics, by no means just algebraic topology, would quite 
literally be unthinkable without the language of categories, functors, and natural 
transformations introduced by Eilenberg and MacLane in their 1945 paper. It was 
perhaps inevitable that some such language would have appeared eventually. It was 
certainly not inevitable that such an early systematization would have proven so 
remarkably durable and appropriate; it is hard to imagine that this language will ever be 
supplanted. It's introduction heralded the present golden age of mathematics. (May 
2000:11)
But there's an obstacle that prevents philosophers from coming to terms with post-1930s 
mathematics, and it's one even Lakatos never quite surmounted. He could never see where the 
dialectical excitement will come from if you are locked into a dominant formal system. It seems to 
me that Friedman is caught in a similar bind. We can see this by looking more closely at where 
Friedman takes the principal difference between mathematics and science to lie. One of the most 
important features of his scheme is the occurrence during a revolution of empirical laws becoming 
constitutive principles and similarly former constitutive principles becoming (approximately true) 
empirical facts. For example, what is a contingent fact of the Newtonian universe, that the inertial 
mass and the gravitational mass should be the same, becomes a constitutive principle of the 
Einsteinian picture. On the other hand, the constitutive lack of curvature of the Newtonian universe 
becomes an approximately true, but in places false, description of this universe. This, he claims, is 
where mathematics differs principally from the natural sciences (p. 98). 
But we can find instances to parallel shifts in the status of laws between being empirical and 
being constitutive, even in post-30s mathematics (note 3). By the mid-1940s, there were many ways 
of going from space to group: Cech cohomology, singular cohomology, simplicial cohomology, 
etc., and corresponding homology theories. On some spaces they gave the same answers, but on 
others they differed. With the axiomatisation of homology and cohomology theory by Eilenberg 
and Steenrod, which could not have been written down without the language of category theory, 
what were contingent features of a bunch of ways of extracting algebraic information from a 
topological space became constitutive of what it is to be a homology or cohomology theory. Cech 
homology was found to not to possess one of these features, codified as the exactness axiom, and 
got 'improved' as Steenrod homology, although it was later revived as an example of a partially 
exact homology theory.  
Let's look more closely at what happened to homology theories. Prior to the change 
topological spaces were defined as collections of points satisfying various axioms, although for the 
most part mathematicians dealt with subsets of n-dimensional Euclidean space. Again groups could 
be defined abstractly as sets satisfying certain axioms, but for the most part were realised as 
products of copies of the integers and its quotients, or perhaps as vector spaces over the rationals or 
reals. Processes called homology theories were defined to extract groups indexed by natural 
numbers with mappings between them. Comparisons were made between these theories as to how 
they acted on specific spaces, many coincidences being found.
After Eilenberg-Steenrod, homology theories were natural number indexed families of 
functors satisfying certain axioms. This axiomatisation would not have been written without the 
new language of category theory. Something previously named a homology theory now had to pass 
a test to see whether it was bona fide. One of the consequences of the axiomatisation was that all 
bona fide homology theories would agree on certain basic spaces. Previously 'empirical', or 'quasi-
empirical' if you prefer, facts became either axioms or consequences of the axiomatisation. The old 
fact that there existed a homology theory behaving in a certain atypical way became false, Cech 
'homology' was simply not a homology theory. Debates then ensued about what was the 'right' 
category of topological spaces to allow this new powerful functorial algebraic topology to function 
well.
Now this might be thought of as just a case of the rise of a new definition. Indeed, can't we 
see this episode as a case of what Ian Hacking (2000) takes Lakatos to be highlighting in his role as 
a 'deflator'? The empirical, or rather to use Lakatos's  term, the ‘quasi-empirical',  has been made 
analytic by sufficient work on the definition of the concepts involved.  But that's  not the whole 
story on Lakatos. He's  also someone who believed a mathematician, at least one who "...has talent, 
spark, genius, communicates with, feels the sweep of, and obeys [the] dialectic of ideas" (Lakatos 
1976: 146), will contribute to getting things ‘right':
As far as naïve classification is concerned, nominalists are close to the truth when 
claiming that the only thing that polyhedra have in common is their name. But after a 
few centuries of proofs and refutations, as the theory of polyhedra develops, and 
theoretical classification replaces naïve classification, the balance changes in favour of 
the realist. (Lakatos 1976: 92n)
We are driving here at the notion of the proper organisation of concepts, in this case the right notion 
of mathematical space. In a given conceptual organisation, there are dependency relations which 
resemble very closely those Friedman detects in physics. These organisations can be overturned in 
revolutions (note 4).
But still you might say that there's  a difference. Going along with Friedman, Newtonian 
Gravitation can be recast retrospectively in the language of Riemannian manifolds, where it can 
now be compared with General Theory of Relativity. Evidence - say, observations on Mercury's  
advancing perihelion - is checked against them both, and the former is found wanting. When 
mathematics conducts itself analogously and recasts the past in a new framework, you don't  tend to 
throw things away. Singular, Cech and simplicial cohomology all make fine cohomology theories, 
no single one is the right cohomology theory, and as I mentioned earlier even the aberrant Cech 
homology is still studied. But does this difference amount to much? Aren't we seeing a shift in 
physics in any case to this mathematical way with the treatment of universality classes of models 
and of toy models 
Mathematical physicists are now happy with the idea that they need to study collections of 
models. The Ising model is surely inaccurate about the features of our world, false then, but it's  the 
most computational tractable of a universality class, which includes models we would like to know 
about. Plenty of time is devoted to studying 2 + 1 dimensional models, in the search for insight into 
3 + 1 dimensional ones. And what of investigations into spaces of conformal field theories (the 
distinction between theories and models seems to be becoming blurred), and the dualities relating 
them, or of the idea of ensembles of universes? Oh, that's  just mathematics dressed up as physics 
some say. Write it off if you will, but plenty of physicists work in this way.
All this is, of course, not to suggest that there are no philosophically significant differences 
between mathematics and physics. But one must be careful not to look to impose differences too 
early. If you were appointing a researcher to work on a whale physiology project, you'd surely 
prefer someone who had made a thorough study of elephant physiology, but who had never seen 
the sea, to an oceanographer. 
***
To round out the picture, what prospects are there for meta-scientific philosophical activity to 
intervene in timely fashion to allow for quantum field theory, or quantum gravity, and belatedly 
quantum mechanics, to be properly achieved? Remember the life-line Friedman has provided for 
philosophers distressed by the thought that they might be drowning in a sea of ineffectiveness: 
Philosophy has played an indispensable role in the formulation of that crowning human 
achievement - the General Theory of Relativity - and it should expect to be able to make crucial 
contributions in the future. Looking at the meta-scientific level, whose resources have proved so 
shockingly wanting in the case of quantum mechanics, what do we have on the cards? After Carnap 
comes Kuhn "Our most sophisticated historiography". Perhaps, historians would find more 
conducive Peter Galison's interesting  Peircean response to incommensurability in the final chapter 
of Image and Logic (Galison 1997)? Another way out is to take up Kuhn's hint:
the early models of the sort of history that has so influenced me and my historical 
colleagues is the product of a post-Kantian European tradition which I and my 
philosophical colleagues continue to find opaque. Increasingly, I suspect that anyone 
who believes history may have a deep philosophical import will have to learn to bridge 
the longstanding divide between the Continental and English-language philosophical 
traditions. (Kuhn 1977: xv)
This must surely be music to Friedman's  ears, for who does Kuhn mean? Alexandre Koyré must 
feature and beyond him lies Ernst Cassirer. Now, Cassirer is the one we are encouraged to return to 
at the end of Friedman's  book The Parting of the Ways if we wish to glean from the Neo-Kantian 
tradition more than the pale shadow of it which was projected Westwards by the Vienna Circle 
Diaspora. Friedman in this book sees the origin of what Kuhn refers to as the "longstanding divide" 
in the differences between Carnap and Heidegger. 
Of the philosophy which emerged from those who stayed in Europe we have Habermas's  
notion of communicative rationality, borrowed by Friedman. Elsewhere, van Fraassen (2002) 
appeals to Sartre's  existentialist philosophy of the emotions to understand how we adopt 
revolutionary change. These are strange, but interesting times we live in. For what it's  worth, I 
think we could have saved a lot of time if we'd  only listened to Collingwood in, for example, his 
The Idea of Nature. Indeed, it seems to me that what he's after there is not so far from what 
Friedman's after. Bundling these together with the ideas of Alasdair MacIntyre on tradition-
constituted rational enquiry would be my way to go, and seems to be a natural way to proceed from 
my Towards a Philosophy of Real Mathematics.
But will any of these philosophies help us smooth the passage of the next revolution in 
mathematical physics? For my part, the only way they might is if they can help us revive the 
philosophy of mathematics. While I don't  want to go so far as to claim that all hands should be set 
to the mathematical pump, I propose as an indication of the health of our philosophising we see 
whether mathematics is being taken seriously. For the past few decades we have been failing. The 
questions a philosophy of X should ask are not to be completely determined by the state of 
development of X, but there should be some genuine connection. For too long philosophical work 
on mathematics has let us down. Philosophers of mathematics are at last beginning to progress from 
alluding briefly in a footnote to category theory as another structuralist approach, to a more serious 
form of engagement, but the signs are, however, that it will be a long time before we come close to 
matching the meta-scientific work of a Poincare, a Mach, or a Helmholtz. I fear that all but a 
handful are at least 50 years behind, and the exceptions receive scant encouragement from the 
dominant position, which is all too happy to keep philosophy of mathematics tightly bound to 
philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and analytic metaphysics. Our best hope is to forge 
links to philosophers of science with the kind of vision displayed by Michael Friedman in 
Dynamics of Reason. 
Notes
1. See, e.g., http://www-stud.uni-essen.de/~sb0264/VietriTalk.ps .
2. Using Google, one finds that the search 'revolution' + 'mathematics' often leads to Grothendieck's 
algebraic topology (where toposes originated). It also leads to Eilenberg and Steenrod's algebraic 
topology.
3. For an account drawing parallels between mathematics and science as regards laws and 
happenstantial facts see my ‘Mathematical Kinds, or Being Kind to Mathematics',  http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu/archive/ 00001960/.
4. If one wishes to describe Lakatos as exploring the change of status from quasi-empirical to 
analytic, then the best way to my mind of understanding such 'analyticity' is through the lens of 
Alasdair MacIntyre's Thomistic-Aristotelianism, see especially (1998: 184-185). See Cartier 2001 
for ways to harness two revolutionary reorganisations of ways of thinking about mathematical 
space, those of Grothendieck and Connes.
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